The Case for Parliamentary Government
Not a few
eyebrows were raised among political pundits last week when some 71 legislators
moved a motion in support of re-introduction of the parliamentary system of
government in our country. We understand
that the all-parties bill has gone through its first reading already. Prominent
among its sponsors are: Abdussamad Dasuki (PDP,
Sokoto), Tahir Monguno (APC, Borno), Nicholas Ossai (PDP, Delta), Ossey
Prestige (APGA, Abia) and Kingsley Chinda (PDP, Rivers).
In their statement, the members declared: “We are 71
bi-partisan members of the House of Representatives, who feel that the
parliamentary system of government promulgated by the Lyttleton Constitution of
1954 is the best for Nigeria since the presidential system has reduced us to
the poverty capital of the world.” A
spokesman for the group was quoted as saying that parliamentary systems foster
more accelerated economic growth and development than presidential systems: “Studies
have shown that countries run by presidential systems produce lower output
growth and more volatile inflation. Political and economic instability also
pervades…”
In a related development, the pan-Yoruba group, Afenifere and
the Igbo cultural group Ohanaeze Ndigbo have both come out in support of the
proposal. I myself recall that the Middle Belt Forum, in their Makurdi
Declaration earlier this year, made a strong case for a unicameral
parliamentary federalism.
We
need to go back to first principles. A parliamentary system of government is
one in which the executive, or Prime Minister, is elected from within
parliament rather than directly through universal franchise. The executive and
cabinet are often chosen directly from parliament. In such a system, there is a sort of “fusion”
between legislative and executive power, given that the executive and cabinet
are all drawn from within parliament.
Parliamentary
systems are often characterised by a “dual executive”. The Prime Minister is
usually the head of government. But there is often also a President or Head of State
who is the symbol of the country. In Britain, Sweden, Netherlands and Norway,
the monarch is the Head of State. In India, Singapore, Malaysia and Germany,
they have ceremonial Presidents. In some cases such a ceremonial also President
reserves some constitutional powers to dissolve parliament under certain
clearly defined circumstances.
The
principal advantage of the parliamentary system is that it facilitates the ease
with which legislation can be passed. Whereas presidential systems can lead to
legislative stasis if not outright confrontation, between the executive and
parliament; in parliamentary systems the fact that the Prime Minister and Cabinet
are also legislators makes it relatively easier to pass legislation.
Another
advantage is accountability. Whereas the executive is directly accountable to
the electorate in presidential systems; in parliamentary system he is directly
accountable to parliament. In most parliamentary systems the Prime Minister has
to attend a weekly Question Time in parliament. Government policies are rigorously
scrutinised. The Prime Minister cannot run government by stealth, such as
taking the country into a military alliance with Saudi Arabia or some other
backward feudal enclave. He or she must give full, cogent and convincing
explanations to parliament. And it is often the case that even legislators from
the smallest parties get to ask questions and demand answers for government
policies and actions and/or inactions. Such legislative scrutiny is far less
possible in presidential systems.
It
is an established fact that presidential systems tend to have more powerful,
centralised executives than parliamentary systems. The historian Arthur
Schlesinger famously described the executive in American government as “the
imperial presidency” by virtue of his expansive powers in the twentieth century.
The American presidency is, without the shadow of a doubt, the most powerful
political office on earth. He holds the keys of the country’s nuclear arsenals.
He can send troops to any country at any time, for any purpose. By contrast,
executives in parliamentary systems cannot arrogate to themselves such imperial
powers.
During
a state visit by the President of Poland, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was
reported to have sent an emissary from 10 Downing Street message to Queen
Elizabeth II to find out what colours she was wearing to the state banquet. The
Prime Minister claimed she was trying to avoid any embarrassing colour riots.
Windsor Palace replied rather tersely: “Her Majesty does not seek the opinion
of anyone regarding what she wears”. It would not be the only occasion in which
the Prime Minister would be put in her place.
Another
important difference is the fact that, in a parliamentary system, a government
can be brought down by the simple mechanism of a parliamentary no-confidence
vote. Whereas in presidentialism the executive operates on a fixed term basis
and can only be removed by an elaborate constitutional process of impeachment.
Since
the praetorian intervention by the military in 1966, the Nigerian executive has
been traditionally presidential in letter and spirit. A former senior cabinet
official during the years of military rule, Eric Eniola, has reminded us that when
the Constitution Drafting Committee was being inaugurated by General Murtala
Mohammed on 18 October 1975, the Head of State declared that, “the Supreme Military Council has carefully discussed
and agreed on an executive Presidential system of Government”. The military had tacitly taken a position that
foreclosed further debate on presidentialism.
During
the ensuing constitutional debates, I was an undergraduate at Ahmadu Bello
University. I recall an impassioned submission in favour of the presidential
system by the late Yaya Abubakar, a professor of public administration in ABU. He
argued essentially on the need for a developing country such as ours to have a
strong executive who would not be overly hamstrung to exercise powers to ensure
rapid economic growth. He waxed lyrical on the virtues of presidentialism over
parliamentarianism. Even with my sophomoric mind, the professor rang hollow;
his rhetoric rather unconvincing.
With the benefit of
experience, Eniola laments: “The system has given the key of the treasury to
the executives, legislators and their aides to loot the treasury as they wish.
The poor of yesterday have become instant billionaires all in the name of
democracy….Our type of democracy has made mockery of hard work, honesty and
procedure. Humble men of yesterday now in power in this country have suddenly
turned to monsters, tyrants with abundance of wealth stolen from the treasury
all in the name of presidential system of government….this system of government
is killing us. It is so wasteful and too expensive to operate”.
The
proposition that the parliamentary system is amenable to faster economic growth
is rather debatable. It is an established fact that presidential systems are
generally more stable than parliamentary ones. For example, Italy’s
parliamentary system has seen 40 different governments in a single decade. The
country was going down economically and the lira was worthless until rescued by
the Euro. Some economists have pointed that communist China outgrew India
precisely because of its centralised presidentialism in contrast to India’s
cumbersome parliamentary government.
The
case for parliamentarianism cannot be pitched on economic arguments alone. We
must begin by asking: If the parliamentary system was the best for us, why did
we bungle it in the first place?
First
of all, the federal structure we inherited from the British in 1960 was
lopsided, with the North accounting for about three-quarters of the land size. It
negated one of the fundamental principles of federalism, namely, that no one
region should be of such an overwhelming size as to threaten the other federating
units. Secondly, as the leading Oxford scholar on colonial administration Dame
Margery Perham stated, our three-region model was essentially a tripod, which
by definition, is an unstable structure.
We
also had an odd situation whereby the
leader of the ruling Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), Sir Ahmadu Bello Sardauna
of Sokoto, sent his underling Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, to serve as Prime
Minister. They were, unfortunately, the sort of people who innately believed in
Arewa first and Nigeria only second. To make matters worse, the Willink
Minorities Commission 1957 failed to create an autonomous Middle Belt, thereby subordinating
the northern minorities as second class citizens under a heavy yoke of
oppression and marginalisation in perpetuity. Unfortunately, it also seemed that
the main opposition leader, Obafemi Awolowo, was a Yoruba champion first and only
secondarily a Nigerian patriot.
The
case for parliamentarianism is a compelling one. But it must be anchored on
restructuring of our federation so as to remove some of the egregious
inequities that have prevailed. If we were to go for a parliamentary system
while leaving intact the 36 states, 774 local governments and the motley constituencies,
it would actually generate even more pernicious consequences for the future. Our
party system is also weak and largely controlled by moneybags. The institution of
parliament is also the weakest link in our political system. Unless these institutions
are strengthened, parliamentarianism will not work. As a matter of fact, some countries have decided
that parliamentarianism is no longer meeting their needs and have replaced it with
a presidential system. A good example is the recent case of Turkey under Recep Tayibb
Erdogan.
As
far as I am concerned, reintroduction of parliamentarianism must be part and
parcel of a whole restructuring process anchored on nation building, solidarity
and social justice. We need a New Nigeria that is democratic and that fosters
the rule of law, political stability and economic progress for the good of all.
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